May 2022 - Luna Terra Algorithmic Stablecoin Crash - $55b (Global)
"Do Kwon, a South Korean who graduated from Stanford University, is the creator of TerraUSD." "TerraUSD (UST) is an algorithmic stablecoin that is pegged at $1.00." "Both Terra (LUNA) and TerraUSD (UST) were created by Terraform Labs, founded in 2018 and located in Seoul, South Korea. At the centre of the story is Terra Labs CEO Do Kwon." "Mr. Kwon, a 30-year-old graduate of Stanford University, founded Terraform Labs in 2018 after stints as a software engineer at Microsoft and Apple. (He had a partner, Daniel Shin, who later left the company.)" "Do Kwon, the creator of the cryptos, is a South Korean national, while Terraform Labs and the Luna Foundation Guard, the organisations that support the digital coins, are both registered in Singapore." A designer said that Kwon "has not officially received any payment from the company. There is no token set for him."
"The term stablecoin mostly evokes United States dollar-pegged currencies that aim to maintain a $1 value. But it’s important to remember that this is mostly a matter of convenience. The same mechanisms underpinning today’s USD stablecoins can be used to create coins that are pegged to the euro, gold, even Bitcoin (BTC), Nasdaq futures, or some specific stock, such as Tesla (TSLA)."
"The idea to create an ‘algorithmic stablecoin’ where LUNA could be burnt in order to ‘mint’ UST to stabilize it whenever it loses its 1:1 peg to the dollar, and vice versa, is different to how other stable coins like Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) function. For example if UST hit 0.99, a small amount of LUNA would be burnt, and if it hit 1.01, a small amount of UST would be burnt."
"The creator of Terra, Terraform Labs, has received significant recent venture capital backing and investor interest as a “stablecoin for e-commerce creator.” Terra mints U.S. dollar- and Korean won-pegged algorithmic stablecoins (among others), using a governance balancing token (known as LUNA), with built-in monetary supply and economic incentives including fees and arbitrage opportunities."
"Terraform Labs raised more than $200 million from investment firms such as Lightspeed Venture Partners and Galaxy Digital to fund crypto projects built with the currency, even as critics questioned its technological underpinnings. Luna’s total value ballooned to more than $40 billion, creating a frenzy of excitement that swept up day traders and start-up founders, as well as wealthy investors."
"These stablecoins are then used as payment mechanisms in an ever-expanding Terraform Labs financial “ecosystem,” which also includes a protocol (“Mirror”) to create synthesized assets that track the performance of U.S. stocks, futures, and exchange-traded funds; a lending and savings platform (“Anchor”); and a partner payments platform (“Chai”). Terra also has anticipated plans to add DeFi asset management, additional lending protocols, and decentralized levered insurance protocol to this budding ecosystem."
"Terra stablecoins are the “centerpiece” that interconnect a burgeoning financial “infrastructure” that includes the aforementioned e-commerce payments, synthetic stocks, exchange-traded funds, derivatives, and other financial assets, savings, borrowing, and lending applications. The operation of Terra, as a protocol, incentivizes independent traders to purchase its stablecoins in exchange for LUNA if a stablecoin drops below its peg. The stability of Terra stablecoins transcends DeFi speculation. Given their many applications within its “Terra economy,” these algorithmic stablecoins also directly impacts the economic prospects of a host of businesses and consumers."
"[V]enture investment came pouring in to fund projects built on Luna’s underlying technology, like services for people to exchange cryptocurrencies or borrow and lend TerraUSD. Investors including Arrington Capital and Coinbase Ventures shoveled in more than $200 million between 2018 and 2021, according to PitchBook, which tracks funding."
"Pantera Capital, a hedge fund that invested in Mr. Kwon’s efforts, made a profit of about 100 times its initial investment, after selling roughly 80 percent of its holdings of Luna over the last year, said Paul Veradittakit, an investor at the firm." "Pantera turned $1.7 million into around $170 million." The recent crash was “unfortunate,” Mr. Veradittakit said. “A lot of retail investors have lost money. I’m sure a lot of institutional investors have, too.”
"Singapore’s parliament had already passed a law last month to increase oversight of firms like Luna that are domestically registered crypto companies but mainly operate abroad."
"Under its Payments Services Act 2019, entities that offer payment instruments, such as algorithmic stablecoins, require a Digital Payment Token Services (DPTS) licence. Though Singapore has only issued a DPTS licence to a handful of firms, it has granted many more companies temporary exemptions from the law." "Kwon’s organizations had neither a DPTS licence nor an official exemption, according to Singapore’s Financial Institutions Directory."
"The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been investigating Kwon Do-Hyung for violating the Securities Act, claiming that the blockchain service that made it possible to buy US equities with Terra was a violation of the Securities Act."
"UST is an algorithmic stablecoin and is operated via computer codes that help maintain its price equilibrium. The process involves burning or minting LUNA/UST to maintain the price of these tokens." "If UST traded below $1, [a simple] mechanism helped backstop it. Arbitrageurs would buy the cheap UST, redeem it for LUNA at a rate of 1 UST equaling $1, and sell those tokens on the market at a profit."
"Then there's the reserves. Terraform Labs founder and CEO Do Kwon created the Luna Foundation Guard, a consortium whose job it is to protect the peg. The LFG had about $2.3 billion in bitcoin reserves, with plans to expand that to $10 billion worth of bitcoin and other crypto assets. If UST dipped below $1, bitcoin reserves would be sold and UST bought with the proceeds. If UST goes above $1, creators would sell UST until it goes back to $1, with the profit being used to buy more bitcoin to pad out the reserves."
"It’s important to realize just how fragile the Terra protocol design was. In a nutshell, UST was “collateralized” by LUNA, the gas token of the Terra blockchain. Since there was a fairly solid DeFi and nonfungible token ecosystem developed on Terra, the LUNA token had some inherent value that helped boost the initial supply of UST." "In order for this ecosystem to be continually viable, there must be a perpetual baseline level of demand in the Terra stablecoins and also the governance token, LUNA. In other words, there must be sufficient arbitrage activity between the two tokens, as well as sufficient transactional fees in the Terra ecosystem and mining demand in the network."
"The way the mechanism worked was, in principle, similar to HKD. If UST traded above $1, users could acquire some LUNA and burn it for its dollar value in UST. Crucially, the system assumed that UST was worth $1, so the LUNA burner can just sell the UST on the market for, say, $1.01 and make a profit. They can then recycle the profits into LUNA, burn it again, and continue the cycle. Eventually, the peg would be restored."
"From the beginning, crypto experts were skeptical that an algorithm would keep Mr. Kwon’s twin cryptocurrencies stable. In 2018, a white paper outlining the stablecoin proposal reached the desk of Cyrus Younessi, an analyst for the crypto investment firm Scalar Capital. Mr. Younessi sent a note to his boss, explaining that the project could enter a “death spiral” in which a crash in Luna’s price would bring the stablecoin down with it."
Mr. Kwon dismissed concerns with a taunt: “I don’t debate the poor.” "In July, Kwon mocked a British economist who criticized the so-called algorithmic stablecoin model." "Frances Coppola tweeted saying self-correction mechanisms — of the sort used by TerraUSD, also called UST — will fail when panicking investors are stampeding for the exit." Kwon replied: "I don't debate the poor on Twitter, and sorry I don't have any change on me for her at the moment."
"In April, Luna’s price rose to a peak of $116 from less than $1 in early 2021, minting a generation of crypto millionaires. A community of retail traders formed around the coin, hailing Mr. Kwon as a cult hero. Mike Novogratz, chief executive of Galaxy Digital, which invested in Terraform Labs, announced his support by getting a Luna-themed tattoo."
Mr. Kwon, who operates out of South Korea and Singapore, gloated on social media. In April, he announced that he had named his newborn daughter Luna, tweeting, “My dearest creation named after my greatest invention.”
“It’s the cult of personality — the bombastic, arrogant, Do Kwon attitude — that sucks people in,” said Brad Nickel, who hosts the cryptocurrency podcast “Mission: DeFi.” "He was savagely putting down detractors just days before TerraUSD, which was the world's third-biggest stablecoin and was supposed to trade at $1, tumbled as low as $0.30."
"Never have I expected it to happen so soon and so fast, but it narrows down to the bottom line: if the federal reserve’s fed funds rate was 0% (or close to it), how can one offer a 20% yield on an alleged pegged USD? It can only be done via a. someone paying for it, whether the company (i.e. Terraform Labs / Luna Foundation Guard) or new investors piling it (ponzi-like), or by taking enormous risks to try to obtain these yields via the open markets, which we know wasn’t the case."
"It worked, until it didn’t." "The 30 year old Do Kwon had something of a reputation on Twitter for arrogance, in some circles, so some think it may have been a personal attack as well." "Before the collapse, over $2 billion worth of UST was unstaked (taken out of Anchor Protocol), and hundreds of millions of that was immediately sold. Whether this action was in response to a particularly volatile period, the fact that rising interest rates had affected the broader cryptocurrency market or a malicious attack on Terra’s ecosystem is an ongoing topic of debate."
"One theory was put forward by the founder of Cardano Charles Hoskinson, although he later deleted the tweet."
"He tweeted that a large institution borrowed 100,000 Bitcoin from Gemini exchange. They then exchanged a large amount of that BTC for UST over the counter (OTC) with Do Kwon at a discount. He agreed, lowering the UST liquidity."
"That institution then allegedly dumped large amounts of both BTC and UST on the market causing a liquidation cascade of leveraged longs, slippage and panic selling by investors, many of which sold their LUNA holdings and unstaked their UST to sell it."
"The tweet alleges that Terra was a ponzi scheme that didn’t have enough BTC reserves on hand to prevent that crash. None of these claims are verified and Gemini denied issuing any such loan. However market manipulation is common in all financial markets."
"Hoskinson (@IOHK_Charles) later tweeted that even if Gemini’s tweet is accurate, someone did launch an attack on Terra. Who that was is unknown for now, and social media is rife with speculation and different explanations."
"At 21:44 GMT, Terraform Labs (TFL) withdrew $150 million in UST liquidity. This made the Curve pool relatively balanced, but much smaller."
"At 21:57, a relatively-inactive account ('Wallet A') swapped $85 million UST for USDC in this pool. (This was the largest swap transaction in that particular Curve pool ever.) Such an action pushed the Curve pool out of balance again."
"Moreover, Wallet A had transferred $108 million in UST to Binance earlier in the day, and these transfers coincided with elevated trading volumes at Binance and the worsening liquidity at Curve."
"This excessive mining led to a massive increase in LUNA’s circulating supply, thus crashing its price. The token’s circulating supply was around 345 million in April, which became 6.5 trillion on May 13th." "The Terra (LUNA) crypto token first crashed from $120 to $0.02, a 99.9% correction, of which 99% was within 48 hours of a black swan event on May 11th – 12th." "On May 7, the price of the then-$18-billion algorithmic stablecoin terraUSD (UST), which is supposed to maintain a $1 peg, started to wobble and fell to 35 cents on May 9."
"The coin's price fell from $116 in April to a fraction of a penny at the time of writing. Such an implosion has been seen in small-cap memecoins in the past, but never for something the size of luna, which had a market cap of over $40 billion just last month."
"Update – the LUNA crash continued a further 99%, then again, and finally another 90% drop to reach $0.00000112 against BUSD (Binance USD), the last trading pair to not be delisted by crypto exchanges." By "the evening of May 19, [TerraUSD (UST)] was trading for $0.083." "The crash wiped out the savings of untold numbers of investors overnight." "From May 9 to May 13, at least $55 billion of market cap disappeared, causing colossal losses to many investors."
"The Financial Times reported that the company held $3.5 billion worth of bitcoin in its reserves in a failed attempt to stabilize the price of UST." "The main problem that led to the fall of Terra was that the reserves appeared to be overcollateralized, but in reality, they weren’t." The designers said they "predicted the collapse of Terra and Luna and pointed out the danger to CEO Kwon Do-hyung several times, but they were ignored."
"Kathleen Breitman, a founder of the crypto platform Tezos, said the rise and fall of Luna and TerraUSD were driven by the irresponsible behavior of the institutions backing Mr. Kwon." “You’ve seen a bunch of people trying to trade in their reputations to make quick bucks,” she said. Now, she said, “they’re trying to console people who are seeing their life savings slip out from underneath them. There’s no defense for that.”
The "bank run on LUNA and UST and the ensuing “death spiral” that resulted could have been predicted, said [Ryan Clements, assistant professor at the University of Calgary Faculty of Law], who indeed warned of something like this in an October 2021 paper published in the Wake Forest Law Review."
“Specifically, they require ongoing demand, willing market participants to perform arbitrage and reliable price information. None of these are certain and all of them have been tenuous during times of crisis or heightened volatility.”
“An algorithmic stablecoin is very challenging,” Campbell Harvey, Duke University finance professor and co-author of DeFi and the Future of Finance, told Cointelegraph. “Every time you’re under-collateralized, you run the risk of a so-called bank run.”
"Much of the pain of the collapse has instead been felt by regular traders. On a Reddit forum for Luna evangelists, users shared lists of suicide hotlines, as people who had poured their savings into Luna or TerraUSD expressed despair."
“I felt my heart sink watching Luna go into that downward spiral,” Hank Kennedy, a factory worker in Chicago, told Al Jazeera. “It (the crash) has had a huge impact on my life.
“Now I’m behind on all my bills, and I’ve lost $40,000, which was everything I had in my savings,” Kennedy added. “I was actually thinking that I would be able to make enough money to pay my home off, but instead, I’ve lost everything.”
"Kwon wrote on Twitter last week that he was “heartbroken” about the pain his invention had brought investors and that neither he nor the companies associated with the project had sold UST or Luna to profit from the crash. The statements came after the founder earlier that day proposed a “revival plan” to restart the network and distribute ownership of the project via one billion new tokens issued to holders of the collapsed currency. Kwon and the Luna Foundation Guard did not respond to requests for comment before publication."
"I understand the last 72 hours have been extremely tough on all of you - know that I am resolved to work with every one of you to weather this crisis, and we will build our way out of this. Together." Kwon said on Twitter.
"While most of our efforts had been spent on Terra 2.0 and making sure ecosystem developers can find a home after the depeg incident, we will soon be more proactive in communicating with the press & getting the right information out there," Kwon tweeted on June 9.
"There's a lot of misinformation and falsehood out there, and we promise to do our part in making sure as much of it is correct as possible," Kwon tweeted on June 9.
"The old Terra chain is renamed Terra Luna Classic. The new LUNA 2.0 has a total locked supply of 1.0 billion, which is significantly better than the 6.5 trillion supply of the classic token. 35% of the new tokens are airdropped to previous and existing LUNA holders. 10% of LUNA 2.0 is sent to those who held the token before the UST crash, and 25% is sent to those who still own LUNA Classic and UST. Another 30% is sent to a pool of LUNA investors."
Some praised the new chain. "While LUNA’s crash has significantly impacted the overall crypto industry and created worries for new entrants, we have to remember that it’s not an isolated event. Over the last few years, the crypto industry has seen its fair share of ups and downs. New tokens have emerged with glowing promise, only to fail miserably. Some due to project failures, some due to scams and rug pulls."
"One of the positives in the LUNA case was the continuous efforts and commitments of the Terra team. The team worked tirelessly to support the community in this crisis and implement a revival plan that actually separates itself from the previous mistakes." "The token had maintained consistent growth and correction even during the harshest of market conditions. The crypto community should value that Terra has admitted its mistakes, and the concept of Terra 2.0 shows that it has already started to move away from the previous flawed concept."
However, other articles disagreed. "I believe LUNA 2.0 is a joke and an insult to the investors who were hurt by this incident. The entire value proposition of LUNA itself was built around the UST ponzi, which obviously doesn’t exist in the 'new' protocol."
"I also believe investors and network participants have completely lost their trust in the network, and that it is irresponsible of exchanges and brokers to even allow the trading of this new coin and not simply a market just to get rid of it ASAP."
"Investigators in Seoul, South Korea, are also reportedly investigating Terraform Labs." "South Korean authorities launched an “emergency investigation” into the case. Investors in Singapore have filed police reports, although authorities have yet to make any move." “The government of Singapore is not going to be impressed that a firm registered in its country, with no real material ties to the city-state, has caused such damage to investors around the world,” Sam Reynolds, a Taipei-based crypto analyst at CoinDesk, told Al Jazeera.
"The incident epitomises regulators’ nightmare scenario of crypto projects going wrong and prompted US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to call for regulation of stablecoins – whose selling point is their supposed stability due to being pegged to another currency or commodity – by year’s end. Former lawyers at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) say the agency is probably already investigating the case."
"Employees of Terraform Labs have reportedly told the Securities and Exchange Commission that Do Kwon, the company's co-founder and CEO, was cashing out $80 million a month prior to the crash of the UST and Luna tokens." The search engine Naver, citing South Korean television network JTBC, said the SEC "recently conducted a remote video survey of some of Terra's key designers and focused on inquiring about Terra's poor design structure."
"The United States Securities and Exchange Commission reportedly discovered a situation where $80 million dollars (100 billion won) of the company’s funds every month were sent to different wallets for the operating expense. This reportedly happened a few months before the collapse of Terra. This particular activity, according to the reports, is what raised money laundering suspicions about Do Kwon."
"The SEC reportedly found that about 100 billion won, or $78.1 billion, of company funds went out every month for operating expenses a few months before Terra collapsed." "The SEC has secured internal statements that "the funds flowed into dozens of cryptocurrency wallets," JTBC reported." "[T]he SEC is investigating whether the marketing of UST before it crashed violated federal investor protection regulations, according to Bloomberg."
"[These] events could even “chill” institutional and venture capital formation for stablecoin and DeFi projects, at least in the near term, suggested Clements. It will also likely hasten regulatory policy formation in the U.S. and internationally around all stablecoin forms, “identifying taxonomic forms, and distinguishing operational models.” This is needed because algorithmic versions of stablecoins “are not stable and should be distinguished from the fully collateralized forms.”"
“I think more regulatory clarity would need to be established before crypto-specific cooperation with countries could happen,” Reynolds said, referring to the continuing lawsuit between Terraform Labs and the SEC that seeks to establish if the financial watchdog has jurisdiction over the project.
"Even if the company were found liable, it is unclear whether it has the assets to repay investors."
“The question would be, what assets would Terraform Labs and the Luna Foundation Guard have to repay investors?” Reynolds said.
“The Luna Foundation Guard, with its current balance sheet, could only pay out pennies on the dollar. And aside from those balances, it is unlikely that Terraform Labs has material assets sufficient to pay out any claims against it in a meaningful way,” he added."
“Before this happens, we would also need a determination if the collapse happened because of fraud, negligence, a coordinated attack, or market rejection of the platform. Right now, that’s not clear.”
“I think we need to rethink what decentralisation means. What will happen next with Luna will not be based on any consensus formed among its community.”
"As regulators mull over their next move, the saga has offered industry players a moment of pause to reflect on what constitutes good governance and sound investing."
Further Analysis
The Terra/Luna ecosystem consisted of two tokens. Terra was intended to maintain a "stable" value of $1 USD. Luna, on the other hand, was intended to absorb the volatility from Terra. Holders of Terra were given a blockchain-enforced right to redeem their Terra immediately for $1 worth of Luna, something which is commonly referred to in financial circles as a "death spiral bond". In addition, through the anchor protocol, any holders of Terra could stake their tokens for a guaranteed 20% annual return, creating a mechanism increasing the supply of Terra which functioned in similar fashion to a ponzi scheme. A sizable reserve of bitcoin was built up to protect the protocol, however it was far from sufficient.
The exact events which lead up to the collapse are unclear, but it is suspected that a large hedge fund may have convinced the Terra/Luna CEO Do Kwon to issue them a large number of UST at a discount, then dumped these tokens to rapidly lower the value of Terra and cause the peg to be lost. Once the peg was lost, this caused a panic, which caused many investors to exercise their redemption rights, and some of these investors also sold their Luna, lowering it's price. During this time it was possible for arbitrageurs to continually purchase Terra below $1, mint $1 worth of Luna, then trade the resulting Luna back for even more Terra in an endless cycle. While this mechanism was intended to restore Terra to the $1 peg, it failed to overcome the sell pressure, as very few arbitrageurs or existing UST holders wanted to continue holding given the inherent risk.
The Terra peg was never restored, and as a result the supply of Luna continued to grow rapidly, causing the price to fall rapidly. The ability to convert Luna into other coins was also severly limited, and this further accelerated the exit. The entire $50b+ ecosystem built around Terra/Luna vanished to become nearly worthless, causing investors a near total loss of all funds.
How Could This Have Been Prevented?
There were a number of warnings prior to the collapse from multiple experts. No opinions were sought prior to launching the protocol and any attempts to reduce the risk through the reserve fund happened well into the protocol running. Terra was managed largely by Do Kwon himself rather than any group to balance decision making and avoid mistakes. There was no insurance available for investors to protect against protocol failure.
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Sources/Further Reading
Undeniable Proof that LUNA + UST = Ponzi? - YouTube (May 21)
What can other algorithmic stablecoins learn from Terra’s crash? (Jun 18)
The LUNA and UST crash — WTF happened? Will they recover? | The Market Report - YouTube (Jun 18)
What are stablecoins, and how do they work? - YouTube (Jun 18)
UST aftermath: Is there any future for algorithmic stablecoins? (Jun 18)
BUILT TO FAIL: THE INHERENT FRAGILITY OF ALGORITHMIC STABLECOINS - Wake Forest Law Review (Jun 18)
Terra Luna Price Surge By Nearly 60% In Recovery After Horrid Week (Jun 18)
https://www.business2community.com/crypto-news/what-is-terra-luna-and-why-did-it-crash-02493117 (Jun 19)
play (Jun 19)
Luna Crash: Co-Founder Accused of Cashing Out $80M Before Scandal - TheStreet (Jun 19)
@WatcherGuru Twitter (Jun 19)
@WatcherGuru Twitter (Jun 19)
Do Kwon Sent $80 Million a Month to Secret Wallets? (Jun 19)
Was Terra Luna Death Spiral a Result of an Inside Job? (Jun 19)
https://frontline.thehindu.com/columns/C_P_Chandrasekhar/terra-luna-crash-when-the-crypto-casino-crumbled/article65513607.ece (Jun 19)
https://financefeeds.com/understanding-terra-2-0-why-luna-deserves-another-chance/ (Jun 19)
Why Did Terra Luna Crash? • Benzinga (Jun 19)
The Fall of Terra: A Timeline of the Meteoric Rise and Crash of UST and LUNA (Jun 19)
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/18/technology/terra-luna-cryptocurrency-do-kwon.html (Jun 19)
@novogratz Twitter (Jun 19)
@stablekwon Twitter (Jun 19)
TerraUSD Founder Do Kwon Mocked Critics for Being 'Poor' Before UST Crash (Jun 19)
@stablekwon Twitter (Jun 19)
@stablekwon Twitter (Jun 19)
@EncryptedPedro Twitter (Jun 19)
@stablekwon Twitter (Jun 19)
Luna Crypto Crash: How UST Broke and What's Next for Terra - CNET (Jun 19)
Luna Crypto Crash: What Happened To Terra Luna? (Jun 19)
Luna-Terra crash: A brief history of failed algorithmic stablecoins (Jun 19)
What Terra Luna Crash Means For Investors & The Future Of Crypto | Money Mind - YouTube (Jun 19)
Terra Blockchain – An open-source blockchain platform for algorithmic stablecoins (Jun 19)
The Rise and Fall of Terra Luna. The Terra Luna Crash Explained - YouTube (Jun 19)
How This Man Just Caused a $45 BILLION Crash [Terra Luna] - YouTube (Jun 19)
@laurashin Twitter (Jun 19)
What I Lost - And Learnt - In The Terra Luna Crypto Crash - YouTube (Jun 19)
https://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2022/06/01/the-next-stablecoin-collapse-could-be-a-lot-worse (Jun 19)
Binance Officially Sued Over TerraUSD Stablecoin Collapse | HYPEBEAST (Jun 19)
Did Celsius’ Withdrawal Trigger The Terra/ LUNA Collapse? Claim & Response - CoinYar (Jun 19)
Basis (Jun 19)
The Case for Suing Celsius, Terraform Labs (Jul 12)
https://www.greythorn.com/the-collapse-of-anchor (Jul 12)
Latest FUD from Leading ETH Dev || Blockfi & Unchained Capital DATA BREACH - YouTube (Jul 19)
BTC finally hit $100K!!! : CryptoCurrency (Oct 12)
Terra: Why LUNA is Driven By UST Demand! - YouTube (Oct 27)
The Anti-Reflexive Mechanisms of Beanstalk — guy (Nov 30)
Zero to Beanstalk — guy (Nov 30)
@beanthoven Twitter (Dec 1)
Why all isn’t well in the crypto world | Mint (Dec 1)
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